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NOTE

FINDING DIRECTION IN INDIRECTION:
THE DIRECT/INDIRECT AID DISTINCTION IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
David S.Petron*
More than fifty years ago, Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."' Though that star has remained fixed, other stars have from time to time become more prominent in the constitutional heavens. In recent Supreme Court cases,
one development in Establishment Clause jurisprudence has emerged
as such a prominent star. That development is the distinction between direct and indirect state aid to religion.
The importance of the direct/indirect distinction can easily be
seen in one case already pending before the Supreme Court; it is also
prominent in the various disputes over private school vouchers. The
case now pending before the Court is Mitchell v. Helms,2 concerning
the constitutionality of a federal statute commonly known as "Chapter
Two."3 The statute provides federal funds for state and local agencies
to loan computer equipment to private religious schools, and it is being challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause. No recent
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2001; doctoral student in
philosophy, University of Notre Dame; BA, The George Washington University 1997.
I would like to thank Professors Gerard Bradley, Nicole Garnett, Richard Garnett, and
William Kelley for their comments on the manuscript. I would also like to thank my
friends at Notre Dame Law School for their patience, love, and support while I
worked on this project.
1 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (mem.).
3 20 U.S.C.A §§ 7301-73 (West 2000); see also notes 7-14 infra and accompanying text.
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case addresses the constitutionality of private school voucher programs; in fact, the Justices have been careful over the past twelve
months to avoid hearing such a case.4 In several of the lower court
opinions regarding vouchers, however, the constitutional difference
between direct and indirect aid to religion has been explicitly invoked.5 It is quite possible that, with either Mitchell or a voucher case,
the Court will eventually rely on the direct/indirect distinction in order to demarcate the complicated boundaries between church and
state. Whether aid is direct or indirect could therefore become crucial for determining whether the state aid in question is constitutional
under the Establishment Clause.
The difficulty thus far with the direct/indirect aid distinction has
been the Supreme Court's conceptual confusion over what constitutes
indirect aid to religion. That confusion is partly the result of several
different Establishment Clause doctrines related to the distinction between direct and indirect aid. These alternative doctrines, often
4 Some of the cases for which certiorari was denied involved the exclusion of
religious schools from voucher programs, rather than their inclusion; all of the cases
would have presented the question of whether such state aid to religious schools was
constitutional under the Establishment Clause. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999) (finding constitutional the Maine voucher
program's exclusion of religious schools in the face of Equal Protection, Free Exercise, Due Process, and Free Speech Clause challenges); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d
606 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999) (holding that the Arizona tax credit for
private school tuition donations was constitutional); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't,
728 A.2d 127 (Me.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999) (finding the Maine voucher
program constitutional in the face of Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clause challenges); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738
A.2d 539 (Vt.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 626 (1999) (holding that the state constitution
required exclusion of religious schools from voucher program and that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was not implicated); Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (finding the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program constitutional); cf. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834
(N.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that the revised Cleveland voucher program violated the
Establishment Clause); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (holding
that the Cleveland voucher program was unconstitutional on state law grounds,
though asserting in dicta that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause).
5 See Strout, 178 F.3d at 62 ("This dichotomy between direct and indirect aid is a
recurring theme throughout Establishment Clause litigation."); Kotterman, 972 P.2d at
614 ("'[S]chools are no more than indirect recipients of taxpayer contributions, with
the final destination of these funds being determined by individual parents."); Simmons-Harris,711 N.E.2d at 211 (finding that "[tihe primary beneficiaries of the School
Voucher Program are children, not sectarian schools," which creates the "indirect
nature of the aid"); Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617 (emphasizing that state aid reaches
religious schools "only as a result of numerous private choices of the individual parents of school-age children").
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troublesome in their own right, seem to assume some constitutional
distinction between direct and indirect aid to religion without offering any definition of those terms. They therefore need to be untangled before the concept of indirect aid to religion can be clearly
outlined.
In order to make more concrete its analysis of how these various
constitutional doctrines could be applied, this Note takes Mitchell v.
Helms and the voucher program recently enacted in Florida as examples. 6 By way of background, Chapter Two of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 7-the statute at issue in Mitchell-is a
federal program that supplies block grants to states to provide financial support for, among other things, library services and instructional
and media materials for both public and private schools. 9 Chapter
Two requires the equitable participation of children in private schools
in all of its programs,' 0 but because the participation of private, religious schools raises the possibility of an Establishment Clause violation, Chapter Two contains several statutory safeguards limiting how
funds can be distributed. For example, aid to private schools is re6 The Florida program makes a good model not only because it is quite typical
of voucher programs, but also because it has not yet been subjected to a full cycle of
litigation. Programs in Wisconsin, Arizona, Maine, and Ohio have already been litigated in the highest courts of those states. Florida, therefore, presents a somewhat
"fresher" example of a voucher program.
7 On October 20, 1994, Congress enacted a new set of amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518. What is commonly referred to as "Chapter Two"
is now Subchapter VI in the latest version of the statute. Subchapter VI is codified at
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7301-73 (West 2000). Following the practice of the Fifth Circuit in
Helms v. Picard,151 F.3d 347, 367 n.14 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.granted sub nom. Mitchell v.
Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999), I will refer to this statute as "Chapter Two," but I will
cite to the most current version of the legislation. Walker v. San FranciscoUnified School
District, 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995), however, refers to the 1988 version of Chapter
Two, which was formerly codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2941-71 (West 1988). There are
no relevant differences between the 1988 and 1994 versions.
8 Prior to Mitchell, the constitutionality of Chapter Two has been considered in
only two Court of Appeals cases: Helms, 151 F.3d at 347 (finding Chapter Two unconstitutional), and Walker, 46 F.3d at 1449 (upholding the constitutionality of Chapter
Two).
9 See 20 U.S.CA § 7301(b) (4). "Instructional materials" include, perhaps most
importantly, computers. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 367. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae
on Behalf of Arizona Council for Academic Private Education et al., in Support of
Petitioners, Mitchell v. Helms, cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (No. 98-1648),
available in 1999 WL 642412.
10 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7372(a). In Jefferson Parish, the school district whose program was challenged in Helms, 30% of the funds provided by Chapter Two were allocated to nonpublic schools. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 368.
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stricted to "secular, neutral, and nonideological services, materials,
and equipment."'" All federal funds must supplement the resources
already available, and they can in no case supplant other sources of
funding. 12 In addition, "the control of funds... and title to materials,
equipment, and property [provided] ...with such funds, shall be in a

public agency.., and a public agency shall administer such funds and
property."' 3 In short, Chapter Two allows local education agencies to
make loans of instructional materials and equipment to religious
schools. Although no funds flow to the religious schools, the fact that
the equipment is loaned to schools-rather than to students or parents-means that Chapter Two might provide a kind of forbidden direct aid to religion.
This Note also scrutinizes the Florida private school voucher program, known as the "A+ Plan for Education."' 4 The foundation of the
program is a statewide assessment of public schools, which would assign to each school an annual performance grade from "A" to "F."* 5
Unlike some other voucher programs, the Florida A+ Plan limits its
voucher eligibility according to these school performance grades. 16 A
student in Florida is eligible for an "opportunity scholarship" to use at
a participating nonpublic school if that student attended a school that
received two "F" grades in any four-year period.' 7 Participating private schools may be religious schools that satisfy all of the eligibility
requirements.' 8
Taken together, Chapter Two and the Florida A+ Plan have the
right characteristics to present test cases for the distinction between
direct and indirect aid to religious institutions. This Note draws upon
11

20 U.S.C.A. § 7372(a)(1).

12

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7371 (b); see also Part II.C infra (discussing the supplement/

supplant distinction).
13 20 U.S.C.A. § 7372(c)(1).
14 See generally 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 7 (West); EXEcUr1VE

OFFICE OF THE

A+ PLAN FOR EDUCATION (visited Jan. 17, 2000),
<http://ww.state.fl.us/eog/press-releases/anuary/_25_education.html>.
15 See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 7 (West). "A"schools are those making
excellent progress towards state goals, "B"schools making above average progress, "C"
schools making satisfactory progress, "D" schools making less than satisfactory progress, and "F"schools failing to make adequate progress. See id.
16 The primary limitations on the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, for example, were that students had to come from families whose income did not exceed 1.75
times the federal poverty level and that a maximum of 15% of the school district's
population could participate in the program. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2) (West
GOVERNOR, THE BUSH/BRoGAN

1999).
17 See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 2(2) (a) (West). Students may also attend
neighboring public schools with grades of "C"or better. See id. § 2(3) (a)-(b).
18

See id. § 2(4).
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these two programs to explore the boundaries of the direct/indirect

distinction as it applies to state aid to religion. Part I explains the
importance of the direct/indirect distinction and gives some possible
reasons for its prominence in recent Establishment Clause cases. Part
II considers three doctrines that are closely related to the direct/indirect distinction, all of which can become entangled in any discussion

of whether state aid to religion is direct or indirect. Part 1H then considers the direct/indirect distinction itself, particularly three different
interpretations of the distinction and their relative strengths.
I.

A DIsTINoON wrIH A DIFFERENCE

When dealing with an issue related to the religion clauses of the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court occasionally draws lines in shifting sands and attempts to distinguish apparently indistinguishable
cases. This practice results in the sometimes confused rationales the
Court offers to justify its decisions. To take just a few examples, the

Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia'9
confronted the question of whether the University of Virginia could
constitutionally deny generally available financial support to a stu-

dent-managed religious newspaper.20 In analogizing the situation to a
state-sponsored "limited forum" in a freedom of speech paradigm, the
Court admitted that the funding scheme was "a forum more in a metaphysical than a spatial or geographic sense."21 Similarly, the Court in
Employment Division v. Smith2 2 attempted to distinguish the result in
that case from the apparently contrary rule of Sherbert v. Verner2 3 by
24
postulating a new category of "hybrid rights."

The Court's apparent difficulty with matters of church and state
raises the possibility that its use of the distinction between direct and
indirect aid to religion is as vague and unhelpful as its use of a "metaphysical forum" or a "hybrid right." Much ink can be spilled attempting to explicate these various categories without arriving at any greater
understanding of the contours of the Establishment Clause. If the dif19

515 U.S. 819 (1995).

20
21

See id. at 822-23.
Id. at 830. What makes something a "metaphysical forum" was left unex-

plained by the Court.

22 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

24 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. As with a "metaphysical forum," the Court did
not even sketch the outlines of what a "hybrid right" might be. See id.; see also Thomas
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704-07 (9th Cir.), vacated, 192
F.3d 1208 (1999); William L. Esser, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free
Exercise Plus or ConstitutionalSmoke Screen, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 211 (1998).
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ference between direct and indirect aid is a distinction without a constitutional difference, then there is little cause to be interested in it.
But the direct/indirect distinction is interesting precisely because
it does appear to help explain what kinds of state aid to religion are
constitutionally permissible. The Court's use of the distinction expresses an intuition that if funds go to religion as a result of truly
independent and autonomous decisions, then that kind of aid is constitutional under the Establishment Clause. Indeed, there is at least
one paradigmatic case of indirect aid to religion that almost anyone
would agree is constitutional: "[A] State may issue a paycheck to one
of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a
religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State
may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his
salary."

25

More importantly, there could be significant theoretical convergence on the doctrine that any indirect aid to religion would be permissible. For example, a nonpreferential account of the separation of
church and state holds that aid to religion is acceptable if it does not
27
prefer one sect to another. 26 Indirect aid, perhaps by definition,
cannot amount to the state's preferring one religious group over another, because autonomous individuals make the decisions that ultimately result in any resources reaching religion. Alternatively, an
endorsement principle requires that state aid does not endorse or disapprove of any religious message. 28 Indirect aid, because it is filtered
through an autonomous decisionmaker, cannot give the appearance
of being a governmental stamp of approval. Or again, a coercion
principle requires that the state abstain from coercing any religious
25 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87
(1986). Presumably, another example of truly indirect aid to religion could be found
in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which facilitates charitable giving by federal employees to voluntary health and welfare agencies. See generally Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Faith-based charitable organizations that participate in the CFC stand in a similar position to religious
institutions that receive a state employee's salary as a result of her private and independent choice.
26 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id. at 113 ("The [Establishment] Clause was ... designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over
others.").
27 For possible definitions of "indirect aid," see infra Part III.
28 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 691 (arguing that the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent "the
evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion").
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practice.2 9 Indirect aid does not so coerce anyone, because any participation in a religious practice is the result of the fully private choices
of individuals. In general, it is possible to say that several different
accounts of the "wall of separation between church and state" can
agree with the idea that indirect aid to religion-aid that is somehow
the result of an independent and private choice-is permissible under
the Establishment Clause.
In fact, where there is truly indirect aid to religion there might be
no state action, and therefore the First Amendment of the Constitution would not even be implicated. For there to be any constitutional
violation, there must have been action by the state or its agents. 30
State action is not necessarily limited to cases in which a state or one
of its political subdivisions has exercised power; state action may also
be found when there is private performance of a public function 3 1 or
when the state is entangled in some activity. 32 But if the state merely
provides a benefit like a tuition voucher to parents, the state action
might end at that point. When parents then privately decide to use
that voucher to send their children to a religious school, that decision
might be attributable to the private actor only, not the state. Assuming that some kind of voucher scheme like this is an example of indirect aid to religion, the state action doctrine gives a compelling reason
for thinking that such indirect aid does not violate the Establishment
Clause. After all, without any state action, it is not even possible to
33
allege a constitutional violation.
So, there might be substantial agreement that truly indirect aid to
religion would be constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause. Where substantial disagreement exists is in the meaning
29 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) ("It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise .... ")
30 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The one exception to the state action
doctrine is the proscription of slavery in the 13th Amendment. See United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
31 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
32 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
33 Of course, this discussion does not attempt to delineate just what kinds of aid
are "indirect"; it merely gives an additional reason for thinking that such aid is permissible under the Establishment Clause. See infra Part III.
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of "indirect aid" to religious institutions. That disagreement is exacerbated by the tangle of different constitutional doctrines that relate to
the distinction between direct and indirect aid. Understanding those
alternative doctrines is a necessary preliminary to any inquiry into the
precise definition of the category "indirect aid."
II. ALTERNATVE DocTRrNEs AND

THE DIRECr/INDiREcr

DIsTINCrION

There are several different Establishment Clause doctrines that
overlap the distinction between direct and indirect aid.3 4 A complete
look at the direct/indirect distinction requires consideration of three
alternative constitutional approaches: (1) the distinction between
textbooks and instructional materials, (2) the Lemon test, particularly
as it was reinterpreted in Agostini, and (3) the distinction between aid
that supplements and aid that supplants the resources of religious
institutions.
A.

Textbooks vs. InstructionalMaterials

The constitutional distinction between textbooks and other instructional materials closely corresponds to a possible distinction between direct and indirect aid to religious schools; it is also one of the
strangest features of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Board of
Education v. Allen,3 5 the Supreme Court found that a New York law
permitting school districts to loan textbooks to parochial school students did not offend the First Amendment. The Court acknowledged
that textbooks might have a religious significance that cannot be
found in the bus transportation it permitted in Everson v. Board ofEducation.36 Still, the statute did not permit loans of religious books, and
because school district officials could presumably distinguish between
secular and religious books,3 7 textbook loans were deemed to be permissible. It soon became clear, however, that if textbooks were a form
of licit aid to religious schools, they might be the only such aid permitted. In 1975, the Court decided Meek v. Pittenger,3 8 in which a plurality
of the Justices permitted loans of textbooks to students but found that
loans of instructional material and equipment other than textbooks
were an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The constitutional distinction between textbooks and instructional materials was
34
other
35
36

37
38

For an explanation of how the direct/indirect distinction is related to these
doctrines, see infra text accompanying notes 118-28.
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).

See Allen, 392 U.S. at 245.
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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confirmed two years later in Wolman v. Walter,3 9 which permitted textbook loans on the authority of Allen and Meek but invalidated loans of
instructional material and equipment, even though the loans were
made to students and their parents rather than directly to the schools.
On its face, the distinction between textbook and instructional
materials-items such as periodicals, photographs, maps, charts,
sound recordings, films, projection equipment, recording equipment,
and laboratory equipment4°-seems absurd. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once asked, if the Court will allow books in religious
schools but not maps, what should be done with an atlas?4 1 But beyond the obvious difficulty in line drawing or definition, a further
problem with the distinction is its lack of a sufficiently persuasive justification. In Allen, the Court assumed that school officials could adequately determine the content of the textbooks in order to limit them
to secular texts. 42 In Meek, however, the Court seemed to give two
rationales for distinguishing instructional materials and equipment
and finding them unconstitutional. First, the instructional material
and equipment was loaned "directly to qualifying nonpublic . . .
schools";43 this was different in an important way from textbook loans
that were given to students. Second, the loans of instructional materials and equipment constituted "substantial amounts of direct support"44 to pervasively sectarian schools, which offended the
Establishment Clause. In Wolman, the statute providing loans of instructional materials made those loans to parents instead of directly to
the school, but "[d]espite the technical change in legal bailee, the
program in substance [was] the same." 45 After Wolman, therefore, it
appears that the justification for the textbook/instructional materials
distinction was the quantity of aid involved in the latter.
Yet, the Court has never explained why loans of maps, photographs, or projection equipment are "more substantial" than loans of
textbooks to each nonpublic school student for every secular subject.
The earlier analysis of Allen suggests that the relevant distinction between a textbook and various other kinds of instructional materials is
that a textbook has definitive content, while instructional materials
39 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
40 See Meek, 421 U.S. at 355.
41 See 124 CONG. REC. 25,661 (1978).
42 See Allen, 392 U.S. at 245 ("Absent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities, who constantly face the same problem in selecting textbooks for use in the
public schools, are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books ....
43 Meek, 421 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
45 Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
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like computers and film projectors can be easily diverted to sectarian
uses. However, the Court in Meek noted that even though some instructional materials are "self-policing"4 6 -those that are inherently
secular, nonideological, and neutral-loans of those instructional
materials are unconstitutional. It is hard to imagine how laboratory
equipment could be converted to sectarian instruction, and periodical
subscriptions, musical recordings, and films have content that is just as
determinate as textbooks. Therefore, it would seem that no adequate
justification can be given for the textbook/instructional material distinction. It remains, as the Ninth Circuit has described it, "[a] thin
47
distinction-unmoored from any Establishment Clause principles."
The Justices themselves have noted the inconsistencies in this
constitutional distinction. Writing separately in Meek, Justice Brennan
thought that the large appropriations involved in that case weighed
48
equally against the loans of textbooks and of instructional materials.
Along with Justices Douglas and Marshall, Justice Brennan would have
found the textbook loans at issue in Meek unconstitutional. 49 Justice
Rehnquist wrote separately to comment on the "arbitrariness" 50 of the
plurality's textbook/instructional material distinction. The results in
Wolman were even more fractured, with five different Justices offering
opinions. As happened in Meek, two different groups of five Justices
were willing to permit textbook loans but forbid instructional material
loans. Justice Marshall wrote that he would overrule Allen, thereby
eliminating the need to make this awkward distinction.5 1
Because the textbook/instructional material distinction is narrower and less abstract than the difference between direct and indirect aid, the Supreme Court may be more inclined to use it to settle
relevant Establishment Clause cases in the most limited manner possible. This is certainly possible in Mitchell, in which the petitioners have
concentrated on the application of Meek and Wolman to the issue of
Chapter Two aid to religious schools. The petitioners contend that if
the textbook/instructional material distinction really depends upon
how substantial the aid in question is, then it is significant that the
religious schools and families receiving aid under Chapter Two do not
46
47

Meek, 421 U.S. at 365.
Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).

48

See Meek, 421 U.S. at 377-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
49
50

See id. at 373.

See id. at 389 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51 See Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229, 259 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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comprise a majority of the program's beneficiaries. 52 In the alternative, however, the petitioners argue that Meek and Wolman should be
overruled. 5 3 Given that more recent cases have tended to allow aid to
54
religious schools or to students attending religious schools, it is possible that the Court will reject the strict separationism of Meek and
Wolman. Since the textbook/instructional material distinction derived from those cases lacks a generally accepted justification, and
since it has also led to counter-intuitive results, 55 the Court in Mitchell
might be willing to abandon Meek and Wolman and cut off the limited
reading of the direct/indirect distinction they suggest.
Even if the textbook/instructional materials distinction persists as
one doctrine that overlaps the distinction between direct and indirect
aid to religion, the limited nature of that doctrine makes it impossible
to apply in a variety of Establishment Clause cases. For example, any
constitutionally salient difference between textbooks and instructional
materials would have no substantial effect on the constitutionality of
school voucher programs. The Florida A+ Plan gives opportunity
scholarships to parents so they may send their children to private
schools; 56 those vouchers are not loans of equipment, title to which
must remain in a public agency. A voucher is a species of aid different
from the loan of a computer. Unlike textbooks or laboratory equipment that a school must provide to educate its students adequately,
private school tuition is something parents must pay to the school, not
something the school must give to its students. Of course, some religious schools provide scholarships to some students, just as the Florida voucher program will provide opportunity scholarships. But those
scholarships are not resources that the schools must give to the student to provide an adequate education. The tuition paid to the
school-whether it is paid by the parents themselves, by Florida
through an opportunity scholarship, or by the school itself through its
own scholarship program-is different in kind from a textbook or
computer that the school makes available to students to educate them.
52 See Petitioner's Brief at 32, Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (granting
certiorari) (No. 98-1648), available in 1999 WL 639126.
53 See id. at 33-46.
54 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (lifting an injunction that barred
Title I remedial education programs from operating on religious school property);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-provided
sign language interpreter to assist a deaf student attending a Catholic high school);
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (permitting
state funds to be used by a blind student to attend a private Christian college).
55 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 52, at 38-43.
56 See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 2(2) (b) (West).
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The distinction between permissible loans of textbooks to students and impermissible loans of instructional materials and equipment to schools can be thought of as a rough approximation of the
distinction between direct and indirect state aid to religious schools.
As should be evident, however, the textbook/instructional material
distinction is a constitutional doctrine with several problems, none of
which can be solved conveniently; not only does it lead to strange and
seemingly arbitrary results, it also lacks a sufficient justification.
Though the textbook/instructional materials distinction overlaps the
distinction between direct and indirect aid, the former is itself too
problematic to help explain the latter.
B.

The "Lemon" Test

The second Establishment Clause doctrine that touches on the
direct/indirect distinction is the familiar Lemon test,57 particularly as it
was recast in Agostini v. Felton.58 Before considering what the postAgostini Lemon test might look like, it is worth noting that it is one of
the most criticized aspects of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Five current Justices have questioned the validity of its continued
use.5 9 Some commentators thought that Lemon was dead even before
Agostini.60 Nevertheless, the Court has refused to overrule Lemon and
sign its death certificate. Even in Agostini, the Court confirmed that
"the general principles we use to evaluate whether government aid
violates the Establishment Clause have not changed." 6 1 The Fifth Circuit, considering the constitutionality of Chapter Two in Louisiana,
stated, "As we read Agostini, the Supreme Court has not abandoned,
57 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon test, state action must satisfy three prongs: it must have a secular purpose, it must have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it may not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. See id. at 612-13.
58 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Given the changes that were made to the Lemon test in
Agostini it might be better to refer to this test as the "Agostini test." However, the
Court in Helms continued to speak of the Lemon test, and since that term has become
entrenched in the Establishment Clause vocabulary, it should probably be preserved,
unless the Court were to explicitly overrule Lemon.
59 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398

(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). The five Justices are Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. See id.

60 See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43
(1993).
61

CASE

W. REs. L.

REV. 795

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222. The Court cited as examples its continued use of

Lemon's purpose and effects prongs. See id. at 223.
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nor even fundamentally changed, the Lemon test."62 Injustice Scalia's
colorful phrasing, "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence . . .
attorneys ....,,63

,

frightening the little children and school

If the general principles of Lemon remain good law, what did
change in Agostiniwere "the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect."'' At the very least, the Court recognized that two assumptions about state aid to religious schoolsassumptions essential to the holdings in prior Establishment Clause
cases-had been abandoned. First, Zobrest eliminated the presumption that state-sponsored indoctrination inevitably results from the
placement of public employees in parochial schools. 65 Second, the

Court abandoned the supposition that all direct aid to religious
schools was invalid under the Establishment Clause.6 6 But it would
also seem that Agostini brought about a more thorough overhaul of
the Lemon test than these two changes would indicate. Most importantly, the Court collapsed the third prong of the Lemon test-the entanglement analysis-into the second, effects prong. "[I] t is simplest
to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it ... as an

aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect." 67 This development effectively eliminates a separate prong of the original Lemon test; if entanglement is but one factor to be considered in assessing the effects of
aid to religion, then any entanglement might be outweighed by the
other criteria of effect. 68
Although Agostini brought about a change in the criteria of effects, the Court's explanation of that change is unfortunately convo62 Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 362 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. grantedsub. nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999).
63 Lamb's Chape 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223. Of course, the Agostini Court claimed to be doing
nothing more than recognizingthe changes in criteria that had been effected by earlier
decisions. This understanding was necessary for the Court to provide relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See id. at 237.
65 See id. at 223.
66 See id. at 225.
67 Id. at 233; accordHelms, 151 F.3d at 358-59 (finding that the Agostini Court had
"expressly treated" the entanglement prong as an aspect of the effects prong).
68 "Without an independent 'entanglement' prong,... the Agostini Court's reformulation of the Lemon test is a considerably more lenient establishment analysis .... "
Doug Roberson, Recent Development, The Supreme Court's Shifting Tolerancefor Public
Aid to ParochialSchools and the Implications ofEducationalChoice: Agostini v. Felton, 117
S. Ct. 1997 (1997), 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 861, 872-73 (1997).

1246

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 75:3

luted and in some places apparently contradictory. In one place, the
Court identifies the "three primary criteria" for evaluating whether
governmental aid has the effect of advancing religion as whether the
aid "result[s] in governmental indoctrination; define[s] its recipients
by reference to religion; [and] create[s] an excessive entanglement."69 But these labels can be misleading. The Court cashes out
the second criterion, defining recipients by religion, as an inquiry into
whether the aid creates "a financial incentive to undertake religious
indoctrination," 70 which sounds quite similar to the first criterion.
Neutrality is important for this inquiry into financial incentive, 71 but
neutrality is also a sub-element of the first criterion, governmental indoctrination.7 2 A different confusion handicaps the Court's specification of this first criterion. In explaining that it had abandoned the
assumption that "all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid," 73 the Court specified
that one of the criteria for determining whether a program is permissible direct aid is whether it flowed to the religious school as a result
of an individual's autonomous decisionmaking. 74 It would seem that
if this requirement is satisfied, then permissible direct aid would be
75
aid that was arguably indirect.
The new effects analysis promulgated in Agostini is further complicated by the additional sub-elements that help determine the three
primary criteria above. Presumably, these subordinate criteria will
help to bring the abstract analysis of the Lemon test down to the more
fine-grained level of the facts in any given case. So, in addition to
whether aid is neutrally distributed and directed by the private choices
of individuals, the Court will ask if the aid subsidizes religion by "reliev[ing] the sectarian schoo[l] of costs [it] would have borne in edu69
70
71

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
Id. at 231.
"This incentive is not present... where the aid is allocated on the basis of

neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available
to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id.
72 See id. at 230 (noting that the criteria by which an aid program defines its
recipients are relevant in two respects).
73 Id. at 225.
74 See id. at 226.
75 Of course, this depends on how one disambiguates the meaning of "direct
aid." It is parry because of this confusion that some commentators think that Agostini
erased the distinction between direct and indirect aid. See Robyn D. Kotzker, Recent
Decision, ConstitutionalLaw-Departingftomthe Supreme Court's TraditionalEstablishment
Clause Analysis in the Context of Government Funding to Religious Schools-Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), 71 TEMP. L. REv. 1045, 1077-80 (1998).
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cating [its] students." 76 These three factors will determine whether
the aid results in "improper governmental indoctrination." The excessive entanglement criterion will be determined by the "character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and religious authority."77 Specifically, the Court will
consider the monitoring, administrative cooperation, and potential
for political divisiveness that accompanies the aid program; 78
" [e] ntanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." 79
To summarize the discussion above, the Court might attempt to
integrate these various elements in the following way. The first issue is
whether state aid to religion has a secular purpose. The second issue
is whether that aid has the primary effect of advancing religion.
There are three criteria that courts should use to determine whether
aid has the effect of advancing religion: (1) whether it results in improper governmental indoctrination, (2) whether it creates a financial
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination, and (3) whether it
causes an excessive entanglement of church and state. The factors that
determine whether some aid results in governmental indoctrination
(the first criterion of effect) are (a) whether it is made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited, (b) whether it flows to the
religious institution only as a result of the independent and private
choices of individuals, and (c) whether it relieves the sectarian school
of costs it otherwise would have borne in educating its students. The
factors that determine whether a particular aid program results in an
excessive entanglement (the third criterion of effect) are (a) whether
it requires pervasive monitoring by public employees, (b) whether it
requires administrative cooperation between state and religious authorities, and (c) whether it might increase the danger of political
divisiveness.
Of course, no one really knows what the Lemon test looks like
after Agostini. To make matters worse, the Court has frequently complained about the difficulty of employing the test as a determinative

76

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509

U.S. 1, 12 (1993)) (alterations in original).

77
78
79
Board

Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
See id. at 233.

Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988), and Roemer v.
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976)).
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guide to decisions in Establishment Clause cases. 80 The Meek Court,
for instance, wrote, "It is well to emphasize, however, that the tests
must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify
instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have
been impaired."8 1
If it is difficult to predict what the Lemon test might look like after
further clarification, it is more difficult still to guess at how the Court
might use that analysis to determine the fate of Chapter Two in Mitchell v. Helms. But some general ideas might be sketched out, using the
outline of the Agostini decision given above. No one believes that
Chapter Two lacks a secular purpose, so the first prong of the Lemon
test is likely to be satisfied.8 2 Under the effects analysis, it also seems
reasonable to believe that Chapter Two creates no financial incentive
to undertake religious indoctrination since Chapter Two aid must be
made available to both public and private religious schools on an equitable basis. 83 In fact, in the school district whose Chapter Two program was challenged in Mitchell v. Helms, the majority of the federal
funds-approximately seventy percent 84-were provided to public
schools. 8

5

Given this distribution of aid, no parents would send their

children to a religious school in order to get the benefits of Chapter
Two aid; such aid was more readily available in the public schools.
Similarly, it is unreasonable to think that Chapter Two creates an ex80 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Lemon test is "difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results"); Committee for Public Educ. &Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stephens,
J., dissenting) (referring to "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the
'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman"); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (stating that the Lemon test is "not easily
applied").
81 Meek, 421 U.S. at 358-59.
82 See Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding that Chapter Two's aim of improving education is a valid secular purpose). Because the Fifth Circuit relied exclusively on the textbook/instructional material distinction in Helms, that court did not consider whether Chapter Two had a
valid secular purpose. According to the statute, the objectives of Chapter Two include supporting local education reform efforts, providing funds to implement educational reform programs, encouraging educational innovation and improvement, and
helping to meet the special educational needs of some students. See 20 U.S.C.A.

§ 7301 (b) (West 2000). All of those objects constitute valid secular purposes.
83

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7372(a) (West 2000).

84 See Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 368 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub. nom.
Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S.Ct. 2336 (1999).
85 In San Francisco, only $195,482 of the $903,028 the school district was awarded
under Chapter Two was set aside for private schools. See Walker, 46 F.3d at 1464.
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cessive entanglement between church and state. Compared to the Tidle I programs approved in Agostini, Chapter Two provides no greater
threat of administrative cooperation between parochial and public
school officials, nor is it more likely to result in political divisiveness.
Furthermore, the Agostini Court did not think that monthly visits to
religious schools constituted "pervasive monitoring,"8 6 so it is unlikely

that the more lax supervision of Chapter Two in Helms would result in
87
an excessive entanglement.
The more difficult question is whether Chapter Two results in
governmental indoctrination. Recipients of Chapter Two benefits are
not defined on the basis of religion, since both public and private
religious schools can receive funds. However, it is not clear whether
Chapter Two funds flow to religious schools as the result of private
and independent choices by individuals. On one hand, states apportion Chapter Two funds to private schools on the basis of enrollment
in those schools, 8 8 and the enrollment is wholly determined by the
individual choices of parents. On the other hand, funds and services
provided by Chapter Two must be administered by the states, and to
the extent that the states retain discretion of the use of Chapter Two
funds, there is no intervening private party whose decisions result in
the flow of state aid to religious schools. It is similarly difficult to say
whether Chapter Two aid relieves schools of costs they otherwise
would have borne.8 9 Every computer that is loaned to a religious
school under Chapter Two is one less computer that the school might
purchase with its own funds; to that extent, Chapter Two aid may
seem to result in governmental indoctrination. However, Chapter
Two aid may not supplant funds from other sources.90 If that statutory requirement is satisfied, then it is difficult to imagine how the
Chapter Two funds might otherwise relieve the religious schools of
costs they would have shouldered themselves.
Analysis of the government indoctrination criterion of effects
does not produce any clear determination of the constitutionality of
Chapter Two because the Supreme Court could reach different conclusions about two of the sub-criteria. Worse, Agostini is unclear
about how these three criteria of effects are related to each other; the
Court did not specify whether an aid program must survive scrutiny
86 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
87 State officials conducted monitoring visits at participating schools once every
two years, far less than the monitoring in Agostin4 which the Court did not think
created an excessive entanglement. See Helms, 151 F.3d at 368.
88 See 20 U.S.CA § 7312(a) (West 2000).
89 See infra text accompanying notes 101-12.
90 See 20 U.S.CA. § 7371(b) (West 2000).
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under all of the criteria, or whether those criteria are simply the factors to be employed in a balancing analysis of effects. If a program
must pass each of the three criteria independently, then Chapter Two
might be in jeopardy, but if only a majority of the elements (or some
lesser combination) must be satisfied, then Chapter Two is likely to
survive the challenge. In any event, the example of Chapter Two illustrates that Agostini did little to eliminate some of the persistent ambiguities of the Lemon test.
Using the outline of the Agostini analysis given above, it is also
possible to contemplate the application of each criterion of the effects
prong to school vouchers. First, it is unlikely that governmental indoctrination would result from a voucher program. Voucher programs like the Florida A+ Plan do not define eligibility for opportunity
scholarships in terms of religion, 9' nor do they set any religious qualifications on participating schools. 92 Under the plan, parents can

choose to send eligible children to secular private schools, religious
private schools, or other public schools; this parental choice means
that any money from the state ultimately flows to religious schools
only as the result of an independent and private choice. 9 3 Nor does a
voucher program relieve any of the religious schools' educational
costs, since vouchers are not a resource that the schools must supply
to their students. Second, because vouchers are provided on a neutral
basis, they cannot create a financial incentive to undergo religious indoctrination; Florida's opportunity scholarships could also be used at
participating secular private schools

94

so children can leave the public

school system without being required to go to a religious school.
Third, since a voucher program merely pays the tuition for a student
91 Eligible students must have attended the failing school during a school year in
which the school received the "F" grade, or else they must be new students (entering
kindergarten or first grade) who have been assigned to a failing school for the upcoming year. See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 2(2) (a) (West).
92 The Florida statute sets out many requirements for participating private
schools, but none of them are related to religion. The schools must accept the opportunity scholarship for each student as full payment for all tuition and fees, meet all
health and safety codes, comply with all state statutes governing private schools, adhere to its published disciplinary procedures, and comply with federal race discrimination law. See id. § 2(4).
93 The scholarships are disbursed in quarterly payments, via checks made payable
to the students' parents, but sent directly to the private school. Parents must then
restrictively endorse the checks to the private school. See i&L§ 2(6) (a).
94 Parents of children who attend schools that have received two "F" grades may
opt to send the students to any other public school in their district that has received a
grade of "C" or higher, or to another public school in an adjacent school district. See
id. § 2(3) (a)-(b).

2000]

NOTE: FINDING DIRECTION

IN

INDIRECTION

1251

to attend a private school, the possibility of an excessive entanglement
is slight. There would be little need for pervasive monitoring or extensive administrative cooperation between public and religious
school officials. However, because school vouchers have created a
great deal of political controversy, the political divisiveness element of
the excessive entanglement criterion could be important. Overall, it
would seem that a voucher program would be likely to survive a constitutional challenge using the revamped Lemon test set out above, but
substantial uncertainty remains.
Even though it is possible to predict what results might follow
from an application of the post-Agostini Lemon test to the cases of
Chapter Two and school vouchers, that does not mean that Agostini
created a useful analytical device. The additional criteria for evaluating the effects prong of the Lemon test do not eliminate the earlier
ambiguities; in some ways, Agostini exacerbated the previously-existing
problems. And while the Agostini Court relied upon the distinction
between direct and indirect aid to religion as an element of its Establishment Clause analysis, it did not attempt to specify the boundaries
between those two categories. The post-Agostini Lemon test, therefore,
cannot fully explain the constitutional distinction between direct and
indirect aid to religion.
C. Supplement vs. Supplant
One of the more recent doctrinal developments related to the
direct/indirect distinction would be to make explicitly constitutional
the difference between aid that supplements and aid that supplants
the resources of religious schools. 95 In making this distinction, the
character of the aid involved-whether textbooks or other materials
and equipment-is less important than the function the aid plays in
the religious school, in part because a supplement/supplant distinction could be used to distinguish the aid at issue in Meek and Wolman
95 The supplement/supplant distinction is clearly contained in the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act: "A State or local educational agency may use and allocate funds received under [Chapter Two] only so as to supplement... the level of
funds that would... be made available from non-Federal sources, and in no case may
such funds be used so as to supplant funds from non-Federal sources." 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 7371(b). Whether the supplement/supplant distinction is a creature of statute only
or has some constitutional warrant is a matter of debate. Compare Petitioner's Brief,
supranote 52, at 26 n.16 (arguing that the "supplement, not supplant" rule has never
been recognized as constitutionally required), with Respondent's Brief at 29-30,
Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (granting certiorari) (No. 98-1648), available in 1999 WL 792124.
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from other aid programs, like that of Chapter Two. 9 6 More generally,
it might be thought that "the rule of Meek and Wolman should be limited to cases in which there is an unacceptable risk of diversion of
resources to religious purposes . . . because the aid to a religious

school is not supplementary."97 In other words, the real danger of an
Establishment Clause violation comes from the possibility that state
aid to religious schools would somehow be used for indoctrination; if
the aid is such that it merely supplements the instruction and the resources already provided by the religious school, then there is less risk
of state sponsored indoctrination.
Although there is no case law that definitively adopts the supplement/supplant distinction as a constitutional requirement, it is possible that the Court might do so, perhaps as a further understanding of
the difference between direct and indirect aid to religion. It is important to remember, however, that the supplement/supplant language
is actually derived from the text of a statute. 98 The Agostini Court worried about the effects of aid that supplants religious schools' instruction, but it did not go so far as to announce explicitly any substantive
constitutional rule concerning the distinction. 99 At present, the "supplement, not supplant" rule is a statutory construct that lacks broad
constitutional authority across all Establishment Clause issues.
If the supplement/supplant distinction is to be extended beyond
its statutory basis, it must be grounded in some constitutional requirement already articulated by the Court. The best authority for adopting the distinction is the Zobrest requirement that state aid to religious
schools not "relieve[] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would
have borne in educating their students." 10 0 This rule could be glossed
as permitting aid that is supplemental while forbidding any aid that
supplants other funds or instructional programs. There is little other
support for the supplement/supplant distinction in the Court's opinions other than this particular principle, so if the Court were to adopt
96 See Solicitor General's Brief on Behalf of the Secretary of Education in Support
of Petition for Certiorari at 22 n.12, Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S.Ct. 2336 (1999) (granting certiorari) (Nos. 98-1648, 98-1671).
97 Id. at 24.
98 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7371(b).
99 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997) ("Title I services are by law
supplemental to the regular curricula.") (emphasis added); id.
at 244-47 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
100 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993) (characterizing
the impermissible aid programs in Meek and Ball); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
The Fifth Circuit in Helms noted this as a requirement for aid to religious schools to
be constitutionally permissible. See Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. granted sub. nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S.Ct. 2336 (1999).
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the supplement/supplant distinction as a general Establishment
Clause requirement, it is reasonable to think that state aid would be
considered "supplementary" if it did not "relieve sectarian schools of
costs they otherwise would have borne."
The important question, then, is exactly what constitutes a cost
that a religious school otherwise would have borne. On this point, the
Fifth Circuit in Helms provides a useful example in its analysis of Louisiana's special education program. 1 1 After noting Agostini's use of
the cost-relief rule, the circuit court wrote, "Failure to meet this requirement presupposes that the Jefferson Parish sectarian schools, in
the absence of the special education program, would have 'otherwise
borne' the costs of providing special education services to their exceptional students.' u0 2 Because the religious schools in Helms were not
legally obligated to provide such services, it is impossible for the state's
special education program to relieve those schools of a cost they
otherwise would have borne. 0 3 To take another example,Justice Souter's Agostini dissent implied that the remedial programs at issue in
that case were unconstitutional because they supplanted the secular
teaching responsibilities of the religious schools. 10 4 Importantly, his
rationale for concluding that the remedial programs were not supplemental rested on what he took to be the requirement that the schools
provide such remedial instruction on their own:
The obligation of primary and secondary schools to teach reading
necessarily extends to teaching those who are having a hard time at
it, and the same is true of math. Calling some classes remedial does
not distinguish their subjects from the schools' basic subjects, however inadequately the schools may have been addressing them. 10 5
Granting arguendo that Justice Souter is correct in believing that
schools have an obligation to provide special remedial instruction as
part of their overall educational responsibilities, the presupposition of
his argument is the same as that of the Fifth Circuit: a religious school
can be relieved of the cost of providing some program only if that
program is itself legally required of the school. On this interpretation, Zobrest's cost-relief rule can be violated only in those cases in
which some required program is paid for with state funds. If the supplement/supplant distinction is to be grounded in the existing case
101 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the special education program did not violate the
Establishment Clause. See Helms, 151 F.Sd at 366. That conclusion was not challenged
on appeal, so it is not before the Supreme Court in Mitchell
102 Helms, 151 F.3d at 365.
103 See id.
104 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 244-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
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law, then supplemental aid to religious schools will be any aid that
does not relieve the sectarian school of a cost it otherwise would have
borne in providing some required program, instruction, or resource;
call this the narrow interpretation of the supplement/supplant
106
distinction.
Of course, it is possible to conceive of the supplement/supplant
distinction as broader than Zobrest's cost-relief rule; an aid program
could "supplant" other religious school resources if it paid for any instruction or services that were already provided by the school. But this
broader interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction is untenable for three reasons. First, if aid supplants religious school resources whenever it pays for a program already provided, then a
school could become eligible for such aid simply by discontinuing its
own program prior to receiving the state aid. For example, suppose
that a religious school provided-with its own financial resources-a
special music program; under the broad interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction, any state aid that would help pay for this
program would supplant the resources the school had already committed to it. However, if the school could temporarily cancel the music program and divert those resources to its sectarian instruction,
then it could apply for and receive state funding to institute the music
program, since the state aid would no longer be supplanting existing
school resources. 10 7 So a broader interpretation of supplement/supplant is easily circumvented.
106 This narrow interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction might be
contrary to part of the result reached in Wolman. In that case, Ohio required that
private religious schools meet certain minimum educational standards, as measured
by standardized tests; the State also paid for the standardized tests and their scoring.
See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1977). Because they were required by
the State, the cost of the tests and scoring would have "otherwise be [en] borne" by
the religious schools. Therefore, under this narrow interpretation, the funds to pay
for the tests and scoring would have supplanted the resources of the schools and
would have been unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, found that the
state aid that paid for testing and scoring was constitutional. See id. at 241. Although
this element of Wolman appears to be a counterexample to the narrow interpretation
of the supplement/supplant distinction, it is worth remembering that Wolman was
decided roughly one decade before the substantial changes in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence represented by Witters, Zobrest, and Agostini; the result might be different following that line of cases.
107 Of course, if the music program were required by the state, then the school
would be unable to cancel the program and divert its funding to sectarian education
in order to become eligible for the state aid. But if the music program were required,
it would be brought within the narrower interpretation of the supplement/supplant
distinction. In that case, even the narrower interpretation would mean that state aid
for the music program would be unconstitutional.

2000)

NOTE: FINDING DIRECTION

IN

INDIRECTION

1255

Suppose that, in an effort to eliminate the strategy given in the
example above, courts were to use an even broader interpretation of
what aid is "supplanting," one in which state aid supplanted a religious school's resources if it paid for a program that the school had
offered at any time. This situation points towards the second weakness of a broad interpretation: it would create a powerful disincentive
for private schools to introduce new educational programs into their
curricula. For example, if aid supplanted the resources of a religious
school any time it paid for a program which the school itself had provided at any time, then it would be in the best interests of schools to
never offer some kinds of educational programs in the hope of someday receiving state aid for them. Expending a school's own resources
on a new program would foreclose the possibility of receiving state aid
for such a program in the future, since any future aid for that program would necessarily supplant the resources the school had devoted
to it.
Third, the Supreme Court has explicitly refused to conclude that
state aid improperly supplants private school resources whenever that
aid is used to fund an existing program. The Agostini Court considered that possibility in the Title I context, which contained a statutory
supplement/supplant limitation similar to Chapter Two. As Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court, "We... are unwilling to presume that
the [New York City Board of Education] would violate Tide I regulations by continuing to provide Tide I services to students who attend a
sectarian school that has curtailed its remedial instruction program in
response to Tide I."108 The Court was speaking of the statutory limitation in Title I, but the distinction between funds that supplement and
funds that supplant is the same. If the Court believes that state aid
does not supplant a private school's own funding whenever that funding is curtailed in response to the state aid, then the broader interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction lacks the authority that
can be mustered in favor of the narrower interpretation. Therefore, if
the Court were to adopt the supplement/supplant distinction, it
would be more reasonable for it to take the narrow interpretation, in
which aid is supplementary whenever it would not relieve the religious
school of costs it would have incurred in providing programs, instruction, or resources that are required by law.
It might be possible to attempt to carve out a middle ground between these two positions. The respondents in Mitchell reason that
religious schools would otherwise bear the costs of anything that is
108 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229.
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related to their "core educational functions."' 0 9 This is an intermediate position because core educational functions would probably include programs, instruction, or resources that are not necessarily
required by law (as the narrow interpretation might have it) but
would not include some programs funded by the schools that are peripheral to their central educational missions (as the broad interpretation might have it). The textual support for this middle ground also
draws on Zobrest's worry that state aid would relieve religious schools
of an "otherwise necessary cost of performing their educational function,"l ° but that fails to explain what constitutes a "necessary cost" of
performing the educational function. The narrow interpretation offered above solves the problem simply, by saying that whatever is mandated by the state is necessary to the educational function of the
religious school. But anything related to a "core educational function" could include almost any program, whether or not it was required by the state. So, for example, if the state does not require
music education, such education could still be considered a "core educational function," and any state aid for that program would impermissibly supplant this core educational function.
The difficulty with defining the costs a religious school would
otherwise have borne as "core educational functions" should be evident: almost anything could be redescribed as a core educational
function, meaning that the line between permissible and impermissible aid would become even more obscure. In fact, some kinds of aid
that the Court has found to be constitutionally permissible appear to
assist core educational functions; some examples of such aid might be
textbooks, deaf translation services, remedial education for students
with special needs, or standardized testing and reporting requirements."' But why might a computer be part of the "core educational
function" of a religious school, when schools have educated students
without them for so many years? The narrow interpretation of the
supplement/supplant distinction, which considers "supplementary"
all aid that does not provide for some instruction, program, or resource that is mandated by law, makes it relatively easy to determine
what aid is permissible. "Core educational functions" are comparatively ambiguous, and while they include everything within the reach
109 See Respondent's Brief, supra note 95, at 30.
110 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993).
111 See Respondent's Brief, supra note 95, at 35. Note that this understanding of
the supplement/supplant distinction would explain why the provision of standardized

testing in Wolman would be constitutional. See supra note 106. But this understanding also means that provision of textbooks is not a "core educational function," even
though textbooks are absolutely central to the study of most subjects.
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of the narrow interpretation, they would also include instruction, programs, and resources that are not required. To make it more concrete, if a state mandates that a school provide computer education to
its students, then computers will be necessary to meet that requirement, and therefore state aid to supply computers would supplant a
school's own resources by relieving it of a cost it otherwise would have
borne. But if a state does not require such computer education, and
instead computers are simply used to assist instruction in other statemandated areas, it is not clear whether the provision of those computers is a core educational function for which state aid cannot be
given. Certainly, a school might use computers as a part of a core
educational function, but it also might not use computers at all. It
seems difficult to answer straightforwardly the question of whether
having computers on hand for student use is a "core educational function." As Justice Souter put it in his Agostini dissent, "[T] he line between 'supplemental' and general education [i.e., core educational
functions] is... impossible to draw." 1 2 Therefore, the narrow interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction is best because it is
the only interpretation that leads to reasonably determinate results.
Assuming that the narrow interpretation of the "supplement, not
supplant" rule were made a constitutional requirement, Chapter Two
and school vouchers provide two useful examples of how that rule
could be applied. Under the federal statute, Chapter Two aid is required by law to supplement, and in no way supplant, other resources;" 3 a new, constitutional supplement/supplant rule would
presumably mirror this statutory requirement. Any aid properly distributed according to the statute would satisfy the supplement/supplant distinction and would therefore be constitutional. Perhaps
there would be some circumstances in which some Chapter Two funds
would be provided for religious school programs that supplanted
those schools' own resources by paying for programs, instruction, or
resources that are required by law, and that aid would therefore be
unconstitutional. However, such constitutional violations could be
found only on a case-by-case basis, and they would in no way threaten
the constitutionality of Chapter Two itself. In Mitchell v. Helms, it does
not appear that Chapter Two funds paid for computers or other items
that the religious schools were required by law to provide for their

112 Agostin4 521 U.S. at 246 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113 See 20 U.S.GA. § 7371(b) (West 2000); see also Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347,
367 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub. nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999).
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students. 114 Absent a factual finding that Chapter Two funds were
supplanting costs that the religious schools otherwise would have
borne, the program in Jefferson Parish would be constitutionally permissible, especially under the narrow interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction.
Similarly, a voucher program like the Florida A+ Plan would likely
survive constitutional scrutiny under the "supplement, not supplant"
rule. In order to supplant unconstitutionally costs that would otherwise be borne, state aid to religious schools would have to pay for programs, instruction, or resources that are required of a religious school
by the state. Suppose that Florida's opportunity scholarships are understood to be direct aid given to religious schools in order to pay for
the cost of educating eligible students who themselves pay no tuition
to attend the schools. 115 Since no private schools in Florida are required to admit any student who cannot pay that school's tuition, the
opportunity scholarships do not relieve the school of any cost it otherwise would have borne. The opportunity scholarships would be supplemental only and therefore constitutional. It is possible, of course,
that religious schools do spend some of their own funds to provide
scholarships for some students to attend the school. Under the Florida A+ Plan, a student attending a religious school on such a private
scholarship would never become eligible for an opportunity scholarship that might threaten to "supplant" the private scholarship. 1 16 But
even under a slightly different, counterfactual voucher program in
which such private scholarship students could become eligible for
state tuition vouchers, state vouchers would only supplant the private
scholarships under a broad interpretation of the supplement/supplant distinction. Recall that the broad interpretation of the distinction is less satisfactory than the narrow interpretation, and under the
narrow interpretation, there is little risk of school vouchers unconstitutionally supplanting religious schools' own resources.
Of course, there is an additional difficulty with the supplement/
supplant distinction. The "supplement, not supplant" language is itself borne of a statute, and it is not immediately clear that the statu114 The Chapter Two funds distributed in Jefferson Parish were part of block
grants for "innovative assistance programs" to help "educational reform," so they ap-

parently cannot pay for something otherwise required. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7351 (b) (2)
(West 2000); see also Helms, 151 F.3d at 367.

115 The alternative interpretation, of course, is that the opportunity scholarships
are aid given to parents, who then independently and privately elect to spend the
scholarships at a given religious school. The aid would then reach the schools only
indirectly. See infra Part III.
116 See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 2(2) (a) (West).
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tory language should be extended so that it would have independent
constitutional authority. If it is so extended, then the narrower interpretation of the doctrine has more support in existing Establishment
Clause cases. But the tenuous constitutional authority of the supplement/supplant distinction indicates that it may not be a substitute for
a full account of the difference between direct and indirect state aid
to religion. That distinction requires its own, independent
examination.
Ill.

TBE MEANING OF "DuncT" AND "INDnREcT" AmD

Each of the three different doctrines discussed thus far-the textbook/instructional materials distinction, the post-Agostini Lemon test,
and the supplement/supplant distinction-could serve as a center of
gravity for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example, any
clarification of the Lemon test would become the new analytical framework through which courts will at least try to frame church-state issues.
Similarly, the creation of a general rule that state aid to religious
schools can supplement existing resources so long as it does not supplant them would reshape the existing boundaries of permissible state
action.'1 7 However, the Supreme Court could effect a radical shift in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence if it were to focus on the paradigm in the background of these three analytical methods. That paradigm, only tentatively and ambiguously articulated, is the distinction
between direct and indirect aid to religion.
It takes little effort to expose how the difference between direct
and indirect aid is, at least in part, behind the textbook/instructional
materials distinction, Agostini's analysis of the Lemon test, and the supplement/supplant distinction. To begin, recall that the distinction
between textbooks and other kinds of instructional materials was originally developed in the context of an assistance program that is generally agreed to be an example of indirect aid.11 8 At issue in Board of
Educationv. Allen" 9 was a New York statute that required local school
boards to loan textbooks to all students in a school district, including
those who attended private religious school. Although the loans were
117

If the Court were to emphasize in Mitchell the textbook/instructional materials

distinction-either to affirm it or to overrle it-the effects on Establishment Clause

jurisprudence would be less profound. The textbook/instructional materials distinction is by its nature of limited scope, so it does not have the potential to exert as much
force as a revised and clarified Lemon test or a "supplement, not supplant" rule.
118 For possible definitions of direct and indirect aid, see infra text accompanying
notes 129-34.
119 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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made to students' 2 0-not to the schools-the Court did not emphasize the indirect nature of the aid in finding the statute constitutional.
However, the later cases that continued to permit textbook loans
while forbidding loans of other instructional materials distinguished
the two kinds of aid, in part, on the basis of their being direct or indirect. For example, Meek v. Pittenger12 1 found the textbook loan program at issue there was indistinguishable from that in Allen,12 2 and the
Court explicitly noted that "no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to
schools."'123 The loans of instructional materials, on the other hand,
were specifically characterized as direct aid to religion. "[T]he massive aid provided the church-related nonpublic schools . . . [by the

statute] is neither indirect nor incidental." 124 Wolman v. Walter 12 5 further reinforced the use of the direct/indirect distinction as a rationale
for differentiating permissible textbook loans and impermissible instructional material loans. In Wolman, instructional materials were
loaned to parents and students, but "[d] espite the technical change in
legal bailee, the program in substance [was] the same as [that in
Meek] ."126 In other words, whatever the exact route by which instructional materials are provided, such aid is a kind of direct aid, and it is
therefore unconstitutional. So it would seem that one way of justifying the somewhat arbitrary distinction between textbooks and instructional materials would be to redescribe that doctrine as merely a
specification of the distinction between permissible indirect aid and
impermissible direct aid.
It is fairly obvious how the direct/indirect distinction runs
through the Agostini Court's analysis of the Lemon test: one of the criteria under the effects prong is whether the aid in question results in
improper government indoctrination, and one of the factors for finding government indoctrination is whether the aid is directed by independent and private choice-i.e., whether it is indirect. 127 What is
less obvious is how the direct/indirect aid distinction figures in the
possible supplement/supplant distinction. It might be suggested that
any aid that could possibly be described as supplanting the resources
120 See id. at 239 n.3.
121 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
122 See id. at 359
123 Id. at 360 (quoting Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44) (emphasis added). The program
in Meek was identical in this respect to that in Allen. See id. at 361.
124 Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
125 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
126 Id. at 250.
127 See supra Part II.B for a treatment of the Lemon test.

200o]

NOTE: FINDING DIRECTION IN INDIRECTION

1261

of a parochial school could not be aid that is provided indirectly. If,
as several courts have said, 128 vouchers are a kind of indirect aid, then
when that aid reaches the private school it is reasonable to think that
it could not possibly be supplanting any of the school's own resources.
A school could not plan its own expenditures in a way that relied
upon aid from the independent and autonomous choices of parents-aid from an indirect source-and so it may not be reasonable to
think that such aid could be anything more than supplemental.
The important point from the foregoing analysis is that a constitutional distinction between direct and indirect aid is likely to cut
across these other constitutional doctrines, even if only in the background. In fact, a broad interpretation of the direct/indirect distinction-an interpretation holding, for example, that any form of
indirect aid to religious institutions is constitutional-could completely reshape Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The challenge,
then, is to define the term "indirect" in a way that makes it possible to
determine whether a particular instance of state aid to religion qualifies as indirect and is therefore immune to constitutional challenge.
There are three plausible ways to define "indirect," which can be
called the conduit understanding, the necessity understanding, and
the sufficiency understanding.
The conduit understanding would mean that indirect aid to religion occurs in any case in which no funds or aid flow to religious
coffers. This understanding of what makes aid indirect is suggested in
the majority opinion in Rosenberger; while taking care to explain that
the state aid to religion at issue in that case was not an example of
direct aid, the Court noted, "Neither the Court of Appeals nor the
dissent, we believe, takes sufficient cognizance of the undisputed fact
that no public funds flow directly to [the religious student group's]
coffers." 129 The conduit understanding treats aid as being direct
whenever the government provides some kind of resource-financial
or otherwise-to the religious group itself. On the other hand, if no
government resources actually reach the religious group, then the aid
in question is indirect. So, while the government might not be able to
give money to a religious school to buy computers, it might be able to
reimburse the school for the cost of some service. It would not simply
be a matter of where the money flows, because a government reimbursement for some material purchase, like computers, would be direct aid. The real question is whether any financial or material
resource ends up on the religious institution's balance sheet. Of
128 See supra note 5.
129 Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).
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course, one difficulty with this understanding of direct and indirect
aid is that it might not account for the paradigmatic case of a government employee who diverts his salary to a religious group; since the
money the state pays its employee ultimately flows to the religious
group, it would seem to be unconstitutional under the conduit understanding. But even if the conduit understanding of direct is not a
complete specification of the direct/indirect distinction, it is one preliminary possibility.
At the other end of the spectrum is what could be called the necessity understanding of indirect aid. On this interpretation, if there
is any independent and private choice along some state aid's path to a
religious organization, then that private choice renders the aid indirect. All that is required, in other words, is that some private choice
be a necessary condition for the state aid to reach a religious institution. A simple example should make this interpretation clear. If a
state were to distribute some kind of aid to public and private schools
on a per student basis, then the independent and private choices of
parents to send their children to religious schools would be a necessary condition for any of the aid to reach a particular school. Because
this private decision is necessary to the school's receiving the state
funds, the aid to the school would be considered indirect. The necessity understanding of indirect aid is therefore a very broad interpretation of the direct/indirect distinction, one that could possibly render
many different kinds of aid indirect and therefore constitutional. Perhaps any program that distributed resources to religious groups on a
nondiscretionary basis would be indirect aid.
The third understanding of the direct/indirect distinction
presents an intermediate approach. According to the sufficiency understanding of indirect aid, state aid to religion is indirect only if some
independent and private choice is itself sufficient for the aid to reach
a religious group. To return to the example above, parents might
make the private decision to send their children to religious schools,
but that decision would not be sufficient for any state funds to go to
the religious school. On the other hand, if it were the case that every
student were given the approved textbooks for her required subjects,
regardless of where she went to school, then the parental choice to
send a child to a private religious school would be sufficient for this
aid to go to religion. So, the sufficiency understanding is narrower
than the necessity understanding, but it would still allow aid to flow to
the religious school in a way that the conduit understanding might
not. The sufficiency understanding also provides a neat explanation
of why the example of the government employee is constitutional: the
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employee's decision to tm his paycheck over to the religious organization is the sufficient condition for the funds to reach religion.
There is one other possible understanding of the direct/indirect
distinction, but it is one that is quite clearly mistaken. Justice Souter's
Agostini dissent objected to the Court's decision to "authorize direct
state aid to religious institutions,"130 but it did so on the basis of an
erroneous understanding of what constitutes direct aid. Justice Souter rejected any comparison between the Title I program at issue in
Agostini and the individual benefits that were approved in Witters and
Zobrest. "Instead of aiding isolated individuals within a school system,
New York City's Title I program before [being invalidated in] Aguilar
served about 22,000 private school students, all but 52 of whom attended religious schools."' 3 ' According to Justice Souter, any aid that

is "direct and substantial"is unconstitutional, 13 2 but it is clear that he
thought substantial aid to religion became direct aid by virtue of its
size. The individual aid that was provided in Witters and Zobrest was
"on a scale that could not amount to a systemic supplement," 33 so it
could be considered to be permissible indirect aid to individuals.
What is crucial for Justice Souter, however, is that "even formally individual aid must be seen as aid to a school system when so many individuals receive[] it that it becomes a significantfeature of the system."' 3 4 In short,
when deciding whether state aid to religion is direct or indirect, size
matters; if the amount of aid can be characterized as "massive"-on
some unspecified scale-or the number of students who benefit from
it is substantial, then the aid program will be direct and therefore
unconstitutional.
Clearly, this understanding of the direct/indirect distinction is incorrect. The Court does sometimes speak of impermissible aid to religion as "direct and substantial," 135 but in other places it makes clear
that the categories "direct" and "substantial" are independent of one
another. 3 6 Justice Souter appears to bleed the one category into the
other, so that a large enough aid program would always be considered
direct aid, no matter what its other characteristics. But putting so
130 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).

131 Id. at 251.
132 See id at 250 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985)).
133 Id. at 252.
134 Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 422 U.S. 229, 264 (1977)) (emphasis added).
135 See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985).
136 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975) (characterizing the aid in that
case as "neither indirect nor incidental" and suggesting that they are different
categories).
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much emphasis on the size of the state aid is misguided; one of the
clearest principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that any
unconstitutional aid to religion, even "three pence,"'137 must be forbidden. Perhaps a separate constitutional principle requires that state
aid to religion be forbidden if it is substantial enough-whatever "substantial enough" might mean-but it is strange to think that aid that
would otherwise be indirect somehow becomes direct simply because
of the amount involved.
Rejecting Justice Souter's understanding of the direct/indirect
distinction, however, does not settle which of the other three understandings is best. The conduit understanding of direct aid might be
objectionable because many kinds of aid programs could be reconstructed so that actual aid does not flow to the coffers of religious
institutions. The university funds in Rosenberger are a good example;
simply because the university was paying a third-party printer that provided a service to the religious student group, that aid would be indirect under the conduit approach. Almost any material or financial
benefit that a state might want to provide to a religious school could
be transformed so that the state funds flowed to some third party,
rather than to the religious group. Even if the state wanted to provide
a material benefit, like loaning computers to schools (as is the case
under Chapter Two), it might be possible for schools to rent the
needed equipment from a third party provider and then have the
state pay the bill. And while the conduit understanding of indirect aid
would probably allow for far more state aid than what might be desired, it would also forbid some kinds of state aid that are intuitively
acceptable. If the state were to pay its employee even though it knew
the employee was going to divert all of the money to some religious
group, the conduit understanding, taken in isolation at least, seems to
require that such a situation would be a case of impermissible direct
aid to religion. Since it is generally understood that such a case constitutes indirect state aid to religion, the conduit understanding fails
to satisfy the Establishment Clause; it is both overinclusive and
underinclusive.
Between the other two alternative understandings, it is not clear
which is superior. Under the necessity understanding, state aid to religion is indirect if there is some private and independent choice that
was necessary for the religious institution to receive the aid; this understanding would allow substantial aid to religious schools. Suppose
a state were to decide to allocate on a per student basis a portion of its
137

SeeJames Madison, Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, in 5

THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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education funding for the general use of individual school districts
and then mandate that each school district distribute the state funds,
also on a per student basis, to both public and private schools. In this
case, the state funding would in some sense travel to wherever particular students attended school; the private and independent choice of
parents to send their children to a religious school would be necessary
for a certain amount of state aid to reach the religious institution.
Neutral and generally available state funds would be accessible at both
public and private religious schools on an equal basis. Some might
object that the necessity understanding provides too much aid to religious schools, but some clear rationale would be needed for exclud138
ing religious schools from otherwise generally available resources.
But even if the necessity understanding of indirect aid is constitutionally acceptable, that does not mean that the more modest sufficiency understanding is unacceptable. There are many kinds of state
aid to religion that would qualify as indirect under the necessity understanding that would also count as indirect under the sufficiency
approach. The difference between the understandings would matter
in only some cases, but it is not clear whether that difference renders
one or the other interpretation of the direct/indirect distinction
more acceptable. The exact difference between the two is perhaps
seen most clearly in the two examples of Chapter Two aid and school
vouchers.
According to the federal statute, state education agencies are required to allocate Chapter Two funds to the states on a per student
basis. 139 However, the local authorities have complete discretion to
determine how to spend the Chapter Two funds within their school
districts. 14° Suppose that the states did not have discretion in the
138 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, simply because some neutral and generally available state resource reaches religion, it does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. For example, the availability of police and fire protection for churches
cannot be constitutionally impermissible. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zobrest v. Cata-

lina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75
(1981). The Establishment Clause never requires the exclusion of religious institu-

tions from evenhanded participation in general government benefits. See generally
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Board
of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1

(1989); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
139 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7312(a) (West 2000) ("[T]he State educational agency shall
distribute [the funds] according to the relative enrollments in public and private,
nonprofit schools within the school districts .....

140

See 20 U.S.C.A,. § 7353 (West 2000).
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amount of funding they provided to the public and nonpublic
schools, and that the federal funds had to be distributed on a per
student basis to each school. According to the necessity understanding, Chapter Two would then be indirect aid to religion, since the
choices of parents to send their children to religious schools would be
necessary for any funds to reach a school. With a slight modification,
Chapter Two could be administered so that it would conform to the
requirements of the necessity understanding.
Such a modification would be futile under a sufficiency understanding of indirect aid, however. Because the Chapter Two funds
will always move from the state to the religious school, there would be
no third party whose independent and autonomous choice would be
sufficient for the state aid to reach the religious school. As Justice
Souter put it, "[T]here [would be] no third party standing between
the government and the ultimate religious beneficiary to break the
circuit by its independent discretion to put state money to religious
use."1 4 ' Without the intervening private actor, Chapter Two could
not satisfy the sufficiency understanding of indirect aid to religion.
There is plenty of textual support in the opinions of the Court for the
idea that state aid becomes indirect when there is some private actor
standing between the state and the religious institution, whose independent decisionmaking is sufficient for the state aid to reach its
"ultimate religious beneficiary."' 4 2 And if this sufficiency understanding of indirect aid were endorsed by the Court, then it would follow
that Chapter Two would be unconstitutional direct aid.
While Chapter Two might not pass constitutional scrutiny under
a sufficiency understanding of the direct/indirect distinction, school
vouchers would probably be permissible under either interpretation.
School vouchers like the opportunity scholarships provided in Florida
are an indirect form of aid to religion because parents decide, independently and privately, at which school to use the scholarship. In the
case of a school voucher, there is clearly a private decisionmaker
standing between the government and the beneficiary of the aid. Because the parental choice of where to use a school voucher is the sufficient condition for aid to go to a religious institution, voucher
programs would have to be considered indirect aid under the sufficiency understanding. Hence, voucher programs would survive constitutional scrutiny.
141

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 886 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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See generally id.; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Witters, 474 U.S. at 481; Mueler, 463 U.S.

at 388.
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There is one point about voucher programs that is worth laboring
over, however. The Florida A+ Plan, like the voucher programs in
Milwaukee and elsewhere, delivers the voucher funds to religious
schools through a somewhat complicated vehicle. According to the
Florida statute, scholarship checks are- sent directly to the private
schools, but they are made out to the students' parents, who restrictively endorse them. 143 It should be clear, however, that the scholarship funds cannot be considered to be direct aid simply because the
checks are sent directly to the schools, rather than the parents. In the
past, the Supreme Court has looked beyond similar legal technicalities
in determining whether state aid to religion is constitutional.'4 Regardless of where scholarship checks are sent-or even to whom they
are made payable-the fact remains that a tuition voucher is indirect
aid because parents, and not the state, are controlling who receives
the aid. It does not make a constitutional difference what particular
payment method is used so long as the ultimate decisionmaking authority is in private hands.
It appears that under either of the more reasonable interpretations of the direct/indirect distinction, substantial state aid to religious institutions should be constitutional. Whether the ultimate
contours of the distinction are drawn broadly (as with the necessity
interpretation) or more narrowly (as with the sufficiency interpretation), state aid programs that channel funds through truly independent and autonomous decisionmakers should withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Such programs, like the Florida voucher program, do not
offend the Establishment Clause because they are truly indirect aid to
religion, aid that cannot be attributed to any state actor. And even if a
narrower construction of the direct/indirect distinction becomes accepted, one that requires "indirect aid" to reach religion only as the
result of sufficient private decisionmaking, then it will still be possible
to provide some kinds of state aid to religious schools. This result
follows even if the Court in Mitchellwere to decide that Chapter Two is
a form of impermissible direct aid. 145

143 See 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 398, § 2(b) (6) (West).
144 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (finding that a change in legal
bailee of state equipment loaned to religious schools does not convert an otherwise
unconstitutional program into a constitutional one).

145 It is difficult to speculate as to whether there is any kind of permissible direct
aid, but it may not be correct to assume the category "indirect aid" exhausts the set of
state aid programs that could be constitutional.
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CONCLUSION

Given the difficulties usually associated with the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is not surprising that the doctrinal development of the distinction between direct and indirect aid
to religion has been without clear progress. Part of the difficulty, of
course, has been the substantial overlap of several different judicial
ideas with the direct/indirect distinction. The difference between
textbooks and other instructional materials can be understood as
shorthand examples of indirect and direct aid respectively; similarly,
the categories "direct" and "indirect" play a prominent part in the
Court's restatement of the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton. But if the
direct/indirect distinction is to become an intelligible Establishment
Clause doctrine, it must be understood and delineated separately
from other principles and ideas.
When considered alone, the difference between direct and indirect aid to religion can be defined in many different ways. Some of
these approaches, like the blending of the ideas of direct and substantial aid that is suggested by Justice Souter's dissent in Agostini, are
clearly mistaken. State aid to religion can be substantial without being
direct, and it can be direct without being substantial; there is no reason to think that the two categories are isomorphic. Alternative interpretations have varying strengths and weaknesses; the conduit
understanding of direct and indirect, for example, would yield results
that conflict with some of the settled expectations of the Establishment Clause. Between the necessity and sufficiency interpretations of
indirect aid, however, there is substantial room for disagreement.
But one of these interpretations must be accepted. Before the
distinction between direct and indirect aid to religion can become a
true guiding star for Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court must clarify the categories of direct and indirect aid.
The differences between the challenges presented by Chapter Two
and private school vouchers give the Justices an opportunity for further articulation of the direct/indirect distinction. To be effective,
however, the Court must differentiate this constitutional distinction
from the other doctrines with which it intersects. Only then will the
difficult analytical work of outlining the boundaries between direct
and indirect aid be fruitful. Less useful interpretations, like the conduit understanding of indirect aid, should be discarded, but ultimately it will require careful judgment to determine which of the
alternatives-necessity or sufficiency-is essential to the Establishment Clause.

